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 Abstract 
This paper studies the impacts of incentive compensation to the top five executives on employee 
wages. We employ pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) to measure executive incentive 
compensation. Using data for firms from Wharton Research Data Services over 1992 to 2017 
period, we find that there exists a negative relation between executive incentive compensation and 
employee wages. In addition, we examine the impacts of executive incentive compensation on 
employee wages in different industries and find that the impacts are more severe in non-technology 
firms than in technology firms. Finally, we show that the executives with higher incentive 
compensation are more likely to suppress employee wages in financially distressed firms. Since 
the impacts of incentive compensation to top five executives on employee wages are similar to 
those to CEO, top executives appear to work together as a team, which supports executive 
compensation as team perspective. Furthermore, firm performance may not be promoted by 
granting high incentive compensation to executives. 
 
 
Keywords: Executive incentive compensation, pay-performance sensitivity, average employee 
wages, income inequality, agency conflicts. 
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1. Introduction 
As agency conflicts are one of the most examined issues among academics, financial 
economists have studied whether the corporate executives are paid for what they actually deserve. 
Managers are hired to work for the best interest of the shareholders. However, since shareholders 
cannot be informed of all the information, the managers may select the projects that will benefit 
themselves most. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that inherent agency conflicts between 
shareholders and managers with little or no ownership can lead managers to divert the firm’s 
resources to benefit their own interests. Jensen and Murphy (1990) imply that executive incentives 
are weak by showing that a typical CEO receives only $3.25 for every $1,000 increase in firm 
value. As firms subsequently increase executive incentives, there are concerns on executives, who 
might utilize incentive compensation for their own benefits at the expense of other stakeholders 
(Sappington & Stiglitz, 2004).  
Graefe-Anderson, Pyo, and Zhu (2018) study the impacts of CEO incentive compensation 
on employee wages and conclude that CEO incentive compensation does suppress employee 
wages. What kind of changes would emerge if we consider the incentive compensation to the top 
five executives? Moreover, the impacts of top five executives’ compensation could reflect the way 
in which the top managers are compensated. In the literature, Li (2018) studies how the 
management team represented by the top five executives is compensated. Are they compensated 
as team perspective or individual perspective? If shareholders want to design the compensation as 
team perspective, the impacts of top managers’ compensation should be similar to the impacts of 
CEO’s compensation. In this case, the incentive compensation of top five executives should have 
negative impacts on employee wages as shown by CEO compensation. Therefore, this study could 
provide insights on how top management teams are compensated.  
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This study is to examine the impacts of the top five executive equity-based compensation 
(EBC) on employee wages. While there are numerous papers on executive compensation, there 
are few papers examining the relationship between employee wages and executive compensation, 
especially the compensation of the top five executives. Graefe-Anderson, Pyo, and Zhu (2018) 
show that the corporation’s chief executive officer’s (CEO) compensation policy has impacts on 
shareholders’ wealth as well as on employee wages. Although Baum, Ford, and Zhao (2012) 
examine executive compensation by introducing a new pay-for-performance metric: the top five 
executives’ share of core earnings, we adopt PPS to measure the equity-based compensation to the 
top five executives. Our sample covers the period from fiscal year 1992 to 2017 as available on 
the Execucomp dataset. In addition to the influence of executive compensation, we test the 
relationship between employee wages and other factors such as firm size, leverage ratio, market-
to-book ratio and physical capital intensity.  
In the literature, there are two competing theories regarding executive compensation. One 
is the optimal contracting theory implying that EBC will offer executives incentives to create value 
for the firm and to maximize shareholders’ wealth. That is, when executives are granted EBC, their 
wealth is tied much closer to the shareholders’ wealth and their interests are better aligned with 
shareholders’ (Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2002). On the other hand, the rent extracting theory implies 
that EBC worsen the agency conflicts because EBC allows executives to extract more benefits 
than they deserve from the incentive contracts (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003).  
To improve corporate governance and evaluate the performance of the executives who are 
granted incentive compensation, some firms increase board independence by including more 
independent board members and allow directors to play a better role in balancing CEO’s power. 
Although incentive compensation policies are supposed to motivate mangers’ activities, it may 
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still be hard to remove agency conflicts, in which managers maximize their own wealth at 
the expense of shareholders’ interest. Under such circumstance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
required all the listed firms to increase their board independence. Bhagat and Bolton (2013) find 
that there is a positive relationship between the greater board independence and operating 
performance with the sample during 2003-2007.They use return on asset, stock return and Tobin’ 
Q to measure the firm’s operating performance. They also show that EBC helps executives tie their 
wealth with the firm’s performance, so the three variables are also measures for executives’ 
performance. 
The research question of this paper is to examine whether top five executives’ incentive 
compensation suppresses employee wages because EBC might lead executives to pursue their own 
interest at the expense of employees’ interest. There are some researchers, such as Pagano and 
Volpin (2005) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), studying the relationship between employee 
wages and managerial powers. Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) illustrate that leverage has 
a positive relationship with average employee pay. Recently, Graefe-Anderson, Pyo and Zhu (2018) 
examine the impact of EBC granted to CEO on employee wages and illustrate that CEOs with 
higher EBC are more likely to suppress employee wages. They also test the relationship between 
employee wages and CEO EBC, and show that CEOs are more likely to suppress employee wages 
for firms in a bad financial state than for firms in a good financial state.  
We contribute to the existing literature by extending the study by Graefe-Anderson, Pyo 
and Zhu (2018) and Chemmanur et al. (2013). We focus on the relationship between employee 
wages and EBC to the top five executives, not only to CEO. Our results suggest that executive 
EBC has negative impacts on employee wages. The impacts from EBC to the top five executives 
are more severe in non-technology firms than in technology firms. This income disparity is more 
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evident in financially distressed firms than in financially safe firms. Since the relation between 
compensation to the top five executives and employee wages follows the pattern of CEO 
compensation, it suggests that the top managers work together as a team and are compensated from 
the team perspective. 
The remainder of our paper is developed as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature in more details. Section 3 develops our hypotheses. Section 4 describes our data and the 
data selection procedures and the models designed to test the hypotheses and robustness. Section 
5 presents the empirical results and findings. Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Agency Conflicts 
Berle and Means (1932) argue that large corporations will develop into the separation of 
ownership and control, resulting in the forming of financial system with developed capital market. 
The separation of ownership and control is the cause of agency conflicts. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) indicate that although managers are appointed to create value for the firm, the difference 
between managers’ interests and shareholders’ lead managers to pursue their own benefits at the 
cost of the firm’s resources.  
Jensen (1986) argues that agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are obvious 
in firms with large free cash flow. Managers always hope to enlarge firm size because the size 
growth is always associated with the growth of their compensation (Murphy, 1985). However, 
shareholders want to increase their wealth through managers’ organization and investment 
management. Since these conflicts are more severe when there are large free cash flows, 
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shareholders have to design incentive compensation plan to reduce managers’ organization 
inefficiency.   
John and Knyazeva (2005) examine the effects of corporate governance on agency 
conflicts, payout design, dividend policy and repurchase behavior. They argue that dividend 
payment has the effect of weakening agency conflicts caused by poor governance. Although 
repurchase and dividend payment are both included in the internal governance, repurchases are 
less effective in mitigating agency conflicts because of the treatment of the market to share 
repurchases and irregular payout to managers. Fama and Jensen (1983) hold the similar view to 
solve for the agency conflicts caused by the separation of ownership and control. They argue that 
such kind of agency conflicts can also be mitigated by improving the internal and external 
monitoring.  
2.2 Structure of Executive Compensation  
Researchers indicate that agency conflicts can be alleviated by implementing executives’ 
compensation structure. Murphy (1999) categorizes executives’ compensation into four types as 
the following: base salaries; stock options and restricted stocks; bonuses; the long-term incentive 
plans. Murphy (2012) also discusses the evolution of the structure of CEO pay in response to some 
factors, such as political factors, economic and so on. When facing political intervention, firms 
may increase executives’ pay to adapt to the new circumstance.  
Executive compensation floats in response to economics, firms’ performance, political 
rules or some other conditions. Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) suggest that during the period 1993-
2003, pay to executives has grown much more than the increase of the firm size, performance and 
industry classification. During the period, the equity-based compensation paid by new economy 
firms and old economy firms has both increased, but non-equity-based compensation has not 
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declined meanwhile. Their tests illustrate that the change in compensation can be explained by the 
arm’s-length model and the managerial power model to some extent. Kaplan (2012) also finds that 
CEO compensation has increased significantly in the 1990s and then began to decrease since then.  
The design of executives’ compensation is a heated topic and has influence on firm 
performance. Li (2018) uses two multi-agent moral hazard models to investigate the regime of 
compensation design. Through testing the team model and individual model separately, he finds 
that the tam model is more robust for explaining the relationship between executive compensation 
and firm performance. His findings also indicate that managerial coordination is considered by 
shareholders in the compensation design. Hence, there is a need for a better understanding of the 
compensation design system and the factors that have influence on the compensation efficiency.  
The optimal contracting approach is one of the popular approaches studying the executives’ 
compensation. It argues that contracts are designed to motivate managers to work for the best 
interest of shareholders to alleviate the agency conflicts. However, this method has some 
limitations. Jensen and Murphy (1990b) argue that the executives’ compensation structure is not 
powerful enough to motivate managers in practice due to the limitations on how generously 
managers can be paid.  
Another approach to studying the design of executives’ compensation is the managerial 
power approach. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) explain that under this approach, when the executives’ 
compensation is designed to address the agency problem, it is also a part of the agency problem 
itself. That is, the executives have the managerial power to influence their compensation design 
and their rent extraction will cause the inefficiency of the optimal contracting approach aiming to 
solve for the agency problems. Although the managerial power approach seems contradictive to 
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the optimal contracting approach, the proper executives’ compensation scheme can be achieved 
by considering both of the two approaches.  
Since the design of executives’ compensation is important and complex, it deserves more 
attention from financial economists. There is literature studying the determinants of executives’ 
compensation. Gabaix and Landier (2008) use an equilibrium model to examine the cause of the 
rise in executives’ compensation. They find out that the market capitalization of large firms leads 
the compensation to increase. They also state that firm size can affect executives’ pay positively. 
Similarly, Cheng, Venezia and Lou (2013) find that executive compensation changes in the same 
direction as the degree of international diversification, accounting earning performance, firm size 
and investment opportunities. On the other hand, the compensation level has a negative 
relationship with the degree of industrial diversification.  
There is always debate about the level of executive compensation because the public 
outcries the managers being overpaid. Murphy (1986a) argues that managers are not overpaid 
because the designed compensation package does provide incentives for the managers to work for 
shareholders’ interests and thus helps align the shareholders’ interests with executives’ interests. 
Furthermore, Jensen and Murphy (1990b) provide the information that CEO’s pay level is actually 
decreasing despite the increasing salaries and bonuses. This phenomenon means that their stock-
based compensation is decreasing. Since the stock ownership is the strongest incentive to motivate 
managers to work for the shareholders’ wealth, this decreasing trend will make the top executives 
less devoted to creating wealth for firms. Accordingly, they argue that compensation level is 
important to make the compensation policy incentive and attractive.  
On the other hand, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) state that the pay scheme is not efficient in 
motivating managers. They indicate that managerial influence has weaken executives’ incentives 
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and has affected firms’ value. They also present the idea that executives’ pay should be more 
transparent to the public to better implement the pay arrangements system. In sum, they argue that 
shareholders and board of directors should design and adopt effective pay policies to address the 
problems in executive compensation scheme.  
2.3 Equity-Based Compensation  
EBC is an important component in executive compensation package because it is efficient 
in aligning executives’ interests with shareholders’ interests (Jensen & Murphy, 1990a; Murphy, 
1999). So EBC also has the effect of reducing agency conflicts. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue 
that by granting managers more stock ownership, the managers are more committed to increasing 
firm’s value. Similarly, Fama (1980) also proposes that an efficient managerial labor market helps 
to enhance managers’ performance because the managers’ pay level is decided by their 
performance.  
The level of EBC package depends on several factors. Ofek and Yermack (2000) find that 
the change of stock package granted to managers depends on two forces by examining the 
compensation dataset from 1992 to 1995. One is from EBC through which the board tries to align 
the interests of shareholders with those of managers. The other force comes from the managers’ 
diversifying risk by selling the stocks. That is, when managers already have large stock ownership, 
EBC loses its incentives functions because managers tend to sell the stocks to diversify risk.  
In the literature, there are mixed reports on the relationship between the fraction of stocks 
granted to managers and the firm’s market value. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) examine the 
relationship between the managers’ stock fraction and Tobin’s Q. They find that Tobin’s Q 
increases when the fraction is between 0% and 5% and above 25%, then decreases when between 
5% and 25%. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) do the similar examination and get different findings. 
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They take into account the tenure of managers and find that the changing slope is positive when 
the fraction stays in the two intervals: 0% to 1% and 5% to 20%, and then becomes negative when 
the fraction is between 1% and 5% and bigger than 20%.   
On the other hand, there are studies contradicting to the findings above. Lorderer and 
Martin (1997) test 867 domestic acquisitions and do not find the positive relationship between the 
firm performance and stock ownership granted to managers. They suggest that there may be severe 
problems in corporate resources when managers are granted large fraction of stocks.  
There are studies examining the relationship between EBC level and other forces. Mehran 
(1995) suggests that EBC granted to executives increases when there are more outside directors 
and decreases when there are more outside shareholders. On the other hand, Laux and Laux (2009) 
test the reaction mechanism of EBC to the board committees and audit committees. They conclude 
that the separation of setting CEO pay and monitoring managers lead to high EBC.   
2.4 Measures of Equity-Based Compensation  
There are many different measures of executive compensation in the literature. Murphy 
(2012) measures EBC through two ways: pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and pay-volatility 
sensitivity (PVS). We also use PPS and PVS to proxy for EBC to executives. According to Core 
and Guay (2002), PPS is defined as “Dollar change in the CEO’s wealth associated with a 1% 
change in the firm’s stock price”. PVS is defined as “Dollar change in the CEO’s wealth associated 
with a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns”. Since we are studying 
the top five executives’ compensation, we modify the definitions as following. We define PPS as 
the total dollar changes in the top five executives’ wealth associated with a 1% change in the firm’s 
stock price. And PVS is defined as the total dollar changes in the top five executives’ wealth 
relative to a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns.  
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Furthermore, Baum, Ford and Zhao (2012) introduce the top five executives’ share of core 
earnings to proxy for the executive compensation. By examining S&P 500 companies from 1993 
to 2007, they find that the top five executives’ pay is related to firm performance and firm specific 
characteristics, such as book-to-market ratio and equity risk. They also suggest that the increasing 
of the total compensation of executives is mainly driven by the increasing in the restricted stocks 
and stock options. When they further examine the top five executives’ share of core earnings, it is 
shown that managers receive a declining proportion of core earnings in each dollar of core earnings 
they create for the shareholders.  
Studies examining the relationship between pay and performance report mixed findings. 
Conyon and Peck (1998) find that when outsiders have a main position in boards and compensation 
setting committees, the relation between pay and performance is stronger. Yermack (1996) takes 
into account the board size. He finds that firms tend to have higher PPS and a larger firm value 
with a smaller board.  
However, some researchers report the competing findings. Jensen and Murphy (1990a) 
examine the pay-performance sensitivities by using the sample of 10,400 CEOs from 1,295 
companies. The evidence shows that the relation between executive pay and firm performance is 
weak. The authors state that many factors lead to the weak relationship, such as firm size and 
political stress. Similarly, Parthasarathy, Menon and Bhattacherjee (2006) use net profit margin 
(NPM) and return on asset (ROA) to proxy for firm performance and test pay-performance 
sensitivities. They find that the firm performance has no relation with the total executive pay and 
the proportion of incentive pay to the total compensation.   
There are also studies examining pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS). Rajgopal and Shevlin 
(2002) find that there is a positive relationship between CEO’s incentive pay and the stock return 
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volatility. Based on this, executives will be motivated to select the projects with high volatility in 
return because the high volatility will lead to more EBC to them. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) 
also have similar findings by adopting a three-stage least-squares regression model to examine the 
impact of PVS. The results show that the higher PVS is associated with the riskier investment 
policy, which will lead to the lower PPS. Graefe-Anderson, Pyo and Zhu (2018) run a regression 
model using 34,248 firm-year observations to examine the impacts of EBC to CEO on the 
employee wages. They adapt PPS and PVS as two potential measures for the EBC and find that 
the coefficient of PVS is small and not significant. That is, PVS does not seem to affect employee 
wages. 
2.5 EBC and Employee Wages Relative to Technology Firms 
Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) study the impacts of leverage on CEO compensation 
and average employee wages in technology and non-technology firms. They show that the leverage 
has greater impacts on both CEO pay and average employee wages in non-technology firms than 
in technology firms. Graef-Anderson, Pyo and Zhu (2018) divide their data into two subsets: 
technology and non-technology firms and examine the impacts of CEO compensation on employee 
wages separately. They conclude that CEOs in non-technology firms have greater impacts on 
employee wages.  
2.6 EBC and Employee Wages Relative to Business Cycle 
Business cycles lead to different financial states as well as different bankruptcy possibilities. 
That is, the bankruptcy possibility is low when firms are in good states, while the situation is 
contrary when in bad states. Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) measure the bankruptcy 
probability using Z-score. They divide the dataset into two subsets: financially safe companies and 
financially distressed companies. The results show that in financially safe companies, the effect of 
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firm leverage on average employee wages is significant, while the relationship is not significant in 
financially distressed companies.   
In different financial states, EBC to executives and its impacts on employee wages are 
varied. Recently, Graefe-Anderson, Pyo and Zhu (2018) test the relationship of CEO EBC and 
employee wages during different business cycles. They use bankruptcy possibilities to measure 
the financial states and find that the EBC has greater negative effects on employee wages for the 
firms in a bad state than for firms in a good state. Accordingly, we expect that the impacts of EBC 
to CEO on employee wages are varied for firms in different business cycles.  
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
 Since there is deviation of managers’ interests from shareholders’ interests, managers may 
work for their own wealth, not for the shareholders’ wealth. When firms include EBC in executive 
compensation package, the agency conflicts can be alleviated because executives are motivated to 
increase firm performance. Therefore, executives will enhance firm performance to increase their 
own compensation. Since employee pay is a part of firm expenses, managers can reduce firm 
expenses and improve firm profits by suppressing employee wages. Increasing firm profits can 
boost stock price. Hence, executives will receive more compensation by suppressing employee 
wages. 
 However, there is a concern on employee wages. Employees may might lose incentives 
to maintain their productivity in response to suppressed wages. Since there are still debates about 
the positive relationship between EBC to executives and firm performance, the loss in productivity 
on a small scale might not affect the compensation package of the executives with high managerial 
power. Therefore, if there is no positive relationship between EBC and firm performance, 
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executives may suppress employee wages to increase their own compensation.  
Since we expect the negative relation between employee wages and executive 
compensation, there may also be relationship between the changes of employee wages in the 
current year based on the last year and the changes of EBC to executives in the current year over 
the last year. And we expect this relationship to be also negative.   
 Hence, we have our Hypothesis 1: 
 H1: Top five executives’ compensation does suppress employee wages. That is, there is a 
negative relation between pay-performance sensitivities of the top five executives and employee 
wages. And such negative relation also exists in the changes of employee wages and the changes 
of PPS to the top five executives. 
 To test Hypothesis 1, we build the model by taking the average employee wages as the 
dependent variable and PPS as one of the main independent variables. In the literature, capital 
structure is found to have significant influence on employee pay. We also include leverage as one 
of the main control variables. Chemmanur et al. (2013) examine the relationship between firm 
leverage and average employee pay and find that the leverage has positive influence on employee 
pay. Similarly, Graefe-Anderson, Pyo and Zhu (2018) retain the consistent conclusion with 
Chemmanur et al. (2013) while using PPS as the main independent variable. 
 High firm leverage leads to high probability to go bankrupt. To be compensated for the 
additional risk-taking from the higher bankruptcy possibility, employees may ask for higher wages. 
We conjecture that this relationship still holds in the existent of EBC to the top five executives. 
Therefore, we have our Hypothesis 2: 
 H2: In the existent of EBC to the top five executives, firm leverage has positive 
relationship with average employee wages.  
14 
 Researchers study the relationship between EBC to executives and employee wages, 
taking different industries into consideration. Anderson, Banker and Ravindran (2000) show that 
the components of compensation take different fraction in the total compensation for different 
industries. Chemmanur et al. (2013) test the relationship between leverage and employee wages 
for technology and nontechnology, respectively. They find that firm leverage is higher in 
nontechnology firms and the influence of leverage on employee wages is stronger in 
nontechnology firms.  
Graefe-Anderson, Pyo and Zhu (2018) categorize firms into technology and nontechnology 
firms and examine the impact of PPS on employee wages in the two industries separately. Their 
results show that this impact is stronger for nontechnology firms than for technology firms. This 
leads to our Hypothesis 3: 
 H3: There is difference in the influence of PPS on average employee wages among 
technology and non-technology firms. 
Researchers have investigated the business conditions specific to different business cycles. 
Yang (2005) argues that in bad states, agency conflicts are more serious due to shareholder rights. 
The situation is contrary when in good states. They also suggest that the debt structures are varied 
in good states or bad states. 
Since the financial conditions of firms are different under different business cycles, the 
relation between EBC and employee wages may also be specific to the varied business cycles. 
Graefe-Anderson, Pyo and Zhu (2018) examine the impacts of EBC to CEO on employee wages 
under the different business cycles. They compute the Z-score to decide the financial states of 
firms and run the regression model separately. The results support their hypothesis. That is, the 
coefficients of PPS are different for firms in two financial states. The impacts of EBC on employee 
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wages are greater for financially distressed firms. Therefore, we extend their test and set up 
Hypothesis 4: 
 H4: EBC to the top five executives have different effects on employee wages within the 
different business cycles. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data 
Our sample data covers from January 1992 to December 2017.We estimate pay-
performance sensitivity (PPS) and pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS) to measure dollar incentives 
and volatility incentives derived from the executive’s equity-based compensation, respectively. 
The compensation data to the top five executives are collected from Execucomp database. To 
calculate PPS and PVS, we obtain the data on stock returns from CRSP database. Since a common 
identifier in Execucomp and CRSP database is “CUSIP”, we merge the two databases by “CUSIP” 
variable. Our calculation methods of executive compensation are changed in 2006 because the data 
reporting formats in Execucomp are changed since 2006. In addition, we use Black-Scholes-
Merton model to calculate the option delta and vega. Delta is defined as the dollar change of 
executive EBC corresponding to a 1% change in stock price, while vega refers to the dollar change 
associated with a 1% change in the standard deviation of stock returns. We retrieve the monthly 
risk-free rates from historical data provided by the Federal Reserve website for “Treasury constant 
maturities”. Consistent with the prior literature, we eliminate the finance and utility firms because 
those firms have different operating mechanisms and regulatory restrictions compared to the others. 
We use “COPEROL” and “YEAR” variables to identify the cross-section and time series 
in our panel data set, respectively. We first calculate delta and vega of each executive for each 
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company, and then sum up the delta and vega of the top five executives from each company to be 
PPS and PVS of the company, respectively. To avoid the huge numerical difference among the 
variables in the regression model, we take the natural log of PPS and PVS. After deleting the 
missing values of the natural log of PPS, we have 219,378 executive-year observations and 35,512 
firm-year observations during the sample period. There are 301 unique firms that have non-missing 
data for our dependent and independent variables. In terms of the employee wages, we calculate 
average employee wage as “Staff expense” (XLR) divided by “Number of employees” (EMP), 
variables provided by COMPUSTAT database. We also take the natural log of the average 
employee wage for the regression model. Among the 2,810 unique firms, we have only 301 unique 
firms that report their employee wages. Since only 11% of the firms report their “Staff expenses” 
data, there will be a concern on the sample-selection bias. We conduct the Heckman two-step test 
to address the potential bias concern. 
For the data on firm characteristics, we collect the following variables from COMPUSTAT 
during the period from fiscal year 1992 to 2017: “Total Assets” (AT), “Number of Common Shares 
Outstanding” (CSHO), “Close Price of the Company’s Stock for the Fiscal Year” (PRCC_F), 
“Total Debt in Current Liabilities” (DLC), “Total Long-term Debt” (DLTT), “Earnings Before 
Interest and Taxes” (EBIT), “Net Sales” (SALE) and “Retained Earnings” (RE).  
We also include important control variables such as firm size, leverage ratio, average sales 
per employee, market-to-book ratio (MTB), physical capital intensity (PCI), and quit rates. We 
estimate the firm size using the natural log of market capitalization, which is computed as the 
number of common shares outstanding multiplied by a current market price per share. Based on 
the method used by Leary and Roberts (2010), we measure leverage as market leverage ratio, 
which is computed as the total debt (DLTT+DLC) divided by the sum of the total debt and market 
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value of equity (CSHO*PRCC_F). The variable, average sales per employee, is calculated as the 
sales divided by the number of employees (SALE/EMP). Market-to-book ratio is defined as market 
value of assets to book value of assets (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006). We use physical capital 
intensity to reflect the growth opportunities of the firm. Following Chemmanur et al. (2013), 
physical capital intensity is calculated as the gross property, plant and equipment scaled by total 
assets (PPEGT/AT). We collect quit rates from the database of Job Openings and Labor Turnover 
Survey (JOLTS) provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. To capture the industry effects 
in our regression models, we categorize firms into different industries by the Standard Industrial 
Classification codes and construct industry dummies.  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the key variables used in the regression analysis. 
We present the statistics of PPS and PVS for both CEO and the top five executives. The dependent 
variable, average employee wage, has a mean of $56,339, a median of $51,571 and a standard 
deviation of $38,630. PPS of CEO has a mean of $701,436 and a median of $205,986. Graefe-
Anderson, Pyo and Zhu (2018) examine PPS of CEO from 1992 to 2014. According to their 
statistics, PPS has a mean of $879,276 and a median of $205,999. The different results between 
their study and ours might reflect the different sample periods and the decline of CEO 
compensation. Meanwhile, PPS of the top five executives has a mean of $1,134,104 and a median 
of $472,720. The mean value indicates that the equity-based compensation of the top executives 
changes by $1,134,104 corresponding to per 1% change in the firm’s stock price. PVS of the top 
five executives has a mean of $213,004, which means that the equity-based compensation of the 
top five executives changes by $213,004 when there is a 1% change in the annualized standard 
deviation of stock returns. 
Table 2 presents the sample correlations of the key variables in the analysis of the impacts 
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on employee wages. We observe that nearly all of the correlations are significant at 1% level, 
which suggests that the change in one variable is significantly related to the change in another 
variable. Moreover, “Wage” and “Average sales” have a strong relationship with a coefficient of 
0.726. The absolute value of coefficients of the correlations of “PVS” and “Size”, “Size” and 
“Avgsale” are between 0.3 and 0.5, which implies that the variables have a moderate degree of 
correlations. The absolute value of coefficients of the correlations of the other two variables are 
below 0.29, which indicates a weak relationship between the two. 
4.2 Equity-Based Compensation to Executives 
The two sensitivities, PPS and PVS, can capture incentives provided by executive EBC 
more precisely because EBC levels could be the results of EBC-related transactions or 
compensation-package changes in EBC (Graefe-Anderson, Pyo & Zhu, 2018). More specifically, 
the executive with low EBC but fewer transactions and the executive with high EBC but more 
transactions may have the same level of compensation. However, the two sensitivities (PPS and 
PVS) will remain different for different executives. 
Core and Guay (2002) calculate the option values based on the Black-Scholes (1973) model 
for European call options modified by Merton (1973) to add dividend item. We follow the method 
of Core and Guay (2002).  
Option value=[𝑆𝑒−𝑑𝑇𝑁(𝑍) − 𝑋𝑒−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑍 − 𝜎√𝑇)]         (1) 
where Z = [ln⁡(
𝑆
𝑋
)+T (r-d+
𝜎2
2
)]/𝜎√𝑇, N = cumulative probability function for normal distribution, 
S = price of the underlying stock, X = exercise price of the option, σ⁡= expected volatility of stock 
return over the life of the option, r = risk-free interest rate, T = time to maturity of the option in 
years, d = expected dividend yield over the life of the option.  
We first calculate delta for each executive per year and add up all deltas of the top five 
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executives in each firm to obtain the total-PPS for each firm-year. For Delta of each executive, we 
add up the delta of all exercisable and unexercisable options and the delta of shareholdings. For 
vega of each executive, we sum up the vega of all exercisable and unexercisable options. And we 
sum up the vega of top five executives in each firm to obtain the total-PVS for each firm-year.  
We estimate PPS as the following:  
[
𝜕(𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)
𝜕(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)
+ #𝑆ℎ𝑟. 𝑜𝑤𝑛] × (
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
100
) 
=[𝑒−𝑑𝑇𝑁(𝑍) × #𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + #𝑆ℎ𝑟. 𝑜𝑤𝑛] × (
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
100
)    (2) 
PVS is estimated as: 
[
𝜕(𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)
𝜕(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘⁡𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)
] × 0.01 = ⁡ 𝑒−𝑑𝑇𝑁′(𝑍) × 𝑆√𝑇 × 0.01 × #𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠   (3) 
where N′= normal density function. 
4.3 Employee Wages, Capital Structure and Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
To test, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we run an OLS model with year and industry 
dummy variables. 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
⁡⁡𝛼6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡     (4) 
In this regression model, 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is calculated as the natural log of the average employee 
wage of firm i in the year t. 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the natural log of the total PPS to the top five executives of 
firm i in the year t. 𝑃𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the natural log of the total PVS to the top five executives of firm i in 
the year t. We include year dummy variable and industry dummy variable. According to our 
Hypothesis 2, we expect the coefficient of Leverage 𝛼4 to be positive. Since 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is used 
to gauge the productivity of employees, we expect 𝛼5 to be positive. Berk, Stanton and Zechner 
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(2010) have the conclusion that more capital intensive companies tend to pay employees higher 
wages. Hence, we expect 𝛼7 to be positive. 
4.4 Heckman Two-Step Analysis  
Since many firms do not report labor expenses, there could be a potential sample selection 
bias (Chemmanur et al., 2013). More specifically, if firms with high EBC to executives and high 
employee wages choose not to report labor expenses, our regression results will be biased and 
spurious. To overcome this concern, we conduct Heckman (1979) two-step analysis. Heckman 
(1979) proposes the two-step model to solve for the ordinary specification bias that arises from a 
missing data problem. 
In the first step, our dependent variable,𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡, is one if the firm reports the data of labor 
expenses and zero otherwise. We run the Probit model to examine whether the data on employee 
pay is missing. We also include a dummy variable for firm’s exchange listings to reflect the 
different reporting behaviors by firms in a specific exchange. The other variables remain the same 
as in Eq. (4). The first step model is: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛼4𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 
+⁡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          (5) 
In the second step, we select only the firms of which the data on employee wage is non-
missing and run the OLS regression model to test the impacts of PPS on employee wages. The 
model is shown as in Eq. (6) below: 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑚𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (6) 
In Eq. (6), 𝐼𝑚𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the inverse Mill’s ratio, which is generated in the first step. Heckman 
(1979) and Tobin (1958) propose that the inverse Mill’s ratio can make the parameters derived 
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from the regression model unbiased. Other variables remain the same as in Eq. (5).  
4.5 The Influence of PPS in Technology Firms versus Non-Technology Firms 
In order to test Hypothesis 3, we study the impacts of PPS on employee wages in different 
industries. According to the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code, we divide our data into 
two classes: technology firms and non-technology firms. Following Chemmanur et al. (2013), 
technology firms are those with primary SIC codes: 3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 
4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7372 and 7373. Non-technology firms include those firms with SIC 
codes less than 4000 and are not included as technology firms. Then we run the regression as below 
for the technology and non-technology firms separately. The other variables remain the same as in 
Eq. (4). 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝛾5𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡⁡+𝛾6𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (7) 
To test the distinction between the coefficients of PPS in technology and non-technology 
firms, we create a dummy variable, 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡, which is one if the firm is a technology firm and zero 
otherwise. We also add the product of 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 to capture the difference between the 
coefficients of PPS in technology firms and non-technology firms. The coefficients of PPS in 
technology firms and non-technology firms are denoted as 𝜏𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ  and 𝜏𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ , respectively. 
After adding 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡 and the product of 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡, we have the new model as below: 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜏0 + 𝜏1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖.𝑡 + 𝜏3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏4𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏5𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏6𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜏7𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏8(𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ × 𝑃𝑃𝑆)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (8) 
 If the term (𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ × 𝑃𝑃𝑆)𝑖,𝑡  is statistically significant, then we can say that 𝜏𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ  is 
significantly distinct from 𝜏𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ . The coefficient 𝜏8  is the difference between 𝜏𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ  and 
𝜏𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ.  
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4.6 The Influence of PPS during Different Business Cycles 
In order to test our Hypothesis 4, we divide the firms into two different business cycles 
according to bankruptcy probabilities. To measure the bankruptcy probability, we follow the 
method of Cole, Daniel and Naveen (2006) and Chemmanur et al. (2013) based on the method by 
Altman (1968). They calculate Z-score as:  
Z-score=1.2⁡𝑇1 + 1.4𝑇2 + 3.3𝑇3 + 0.6𝑇4 + 𝑇5 
where 𝑇1=working capital/total assets, 𝑇2=retained earnings/total assets, 𝑇3=earnings before 
interest and taxes/total assets, 𝑇4 =market value of equity/book value of total liabilities, 
𝑇5=sales/total assets.  
Based on Z-score, we divide all the firms into financially safe firms and financially 
distressed firms. Chemmanur et al. (2013) define the firms with Z-score above or equal to 2.99 to 
be financially safe firms, and those with Z-score below or equal to 1.8 to be financially distressed 
firms. We run the regression of model Eq. (7) for the financially safe and distressed firms 
separately. 
As we conjecture that the influence of PPS is different in business cycles, we have a model 
below to capture the difference of the coefficients of PPS for firms in different business cycles. 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑4𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑5𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜑6𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑7𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑8(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 × 𝑃𝑃𝑆)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (9) 
In Eq. (9), 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable, which is one if the firm is in a good state and 
zero otherwise. We adopt an interaction term of 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 to capture the difference 
between the coefficients of PPS for firms in different business cycles. If there is any difference, 
the coefficient of the product term, 𝜑8, will be statistically significant for the difference.  
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4.7 Robustness Tests  
With the regard to endogeneity and alternative variable measures, we conduct robustness 
tests. As we discussed in the previous part, leverage ratio reflects the investment opportunities of 
the firm. That is, the firm’s leverage ratio will be high if it makes more investment. According to 
Harris, Raviv (1991) and Parsons, Titman (2009), if a firm has a high leverage, it implies that the 
firm has a large amount of investment or tangible assets to manage. To ensure investments or 
assets to be well operated, firms need to pay employees high wages. Therefore, the positive 
relationship between employee wages and leverage creates the potential endogeneity problem. We 
deal with the endogeneity problem based on the method of Wooldridge (2002) by introducing a 
two-stage least square (2SLS) regression model.  
For the first stage, we introduce an instrumental variable, which is related to leverage but 
not related to the employee wages. Since the tax benefit of debt is positively related to a firm’s 
marginal tax rate, there is also a positive relation between the marginal tax rate and the firm’s 
leverage ratio (Leary and Roberts, 2010). We could not find the literature suggesting that there is 
a direct relation between marginal tax rate and average employee wages. Following Givoly, Hayn, 
Ofer and Sarig (1992) and Chemmanur et al. (2013), we use marginal tax rates based on income 
before interest expenses as the instrument variable because it meets the requirements above. In the 
spirit of Chemmanur et al. (2013), we add the variable (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 to proxy for the efficiency 
of a firm in generating profits from its assets. We also include 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 to measure the 
volatility of the efficiency of a firm in generating returns from assets. The model of the first step 
is shown below: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃6𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +
⁡𝜃7(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃8𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (10) 
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From the first step, we obtain the fitted value of leverage ratio and use it as an independent 
variable in the second step. The other variables remain the same as in Eq. (10). The model for the 
second step is shown as the following： 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡+𝛼6𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼7(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (11) 
In addition, we introduce another measure for the executives’ performance to further test 
the robustness. Consistent with Graefe-Anderson, Pyo and Zhu (2018), we adopt the excess return 
(𝐸𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡) and add a cross product term of PPS and the excess return in our model. The other 
variables remain the same as in Eq (4). The model is shown as the following:  
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃4𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡+𝜃6𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜃7𝐸𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃8(𝐸𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑡 × 𝑃𝑃𝑆)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (12) 
4.8 The Relation between Changes in Executive Wealth and Changes in Employee Wages 
Since we conjecture that there might be a relation between the changes in executive EBC 
and the changes in employee wages, we construct the model to test this relationship. The model is 
shown as the following: 
∆𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2∆𝑃𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡     (13) 
In this model, ∆𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is computed as the employee wage in the year t minus the 
employee wage in the last year t-1 for firm i. ∆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the difference between the total PPS in 
the year t and the total PPS in the last year t-1 for firm i. ∆𝑃𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡 represents the difference between 
the total PVS in the year t and the total PVS in the last year t-1 for firm i. The other variables stay 
the same as in Eq. (4). 
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5. Results 
 We first provide the summary table for the compensation to workers during different sub-
periods. We move on to estimate the relation between employee wages and compensation to 
executives in the existence of control variables. We continue to investigate the relation between 
PPS and employee wages in both technology and non-technology firms. Then we construct tables 
showing how different the relationship is during different business cycles. Finally, we provide the 
results of the relation between the changes in employee wages and the changes in executive 
compensation. 
5.1 Income Disparity 
 We examine the income disparity during the following three sub-periods: 1992-2000, 
2001-2007 and 2008-2017. Table 3 reports average annual staff expenses, total operating expenses 
and the ratio of average annual staff expense to the annual operating expense. We observe that the 
staff expenses increase from period 1 to period 2 and then go down from period 2 to period 3. The 
ratio of staff expenses to operating expenses declines during the three periods. We note that the 
staff expenses occupy a very high portion of the operating expenses.  
 Table 3 also reports PPS and the total compensation to CEO and to the top five executives. 
We find that the average annual compensation to the top five executives is about 26-60 times to 
the average employee wages. The situation is even worse when considering the average annual 
compensation to CEO, which is 61-100 times more than the average employee wages. This huge 
income disparity between employees and executives might discourage employees from promoting 
working efficiency and thus have a negative influence on firm performance. Kong (2017) states 
that high CEO Pay Slice (CPS) could have a negative impact on firm performance by demotivating 
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employees and destroying team cooperation. It is reasonable to study the income disparity and firm 
performance by investigating how executive compensation affects employee wages.  
5.2 Employee Wages Analysis 
We exhibit the relation of employee wages and CEO compensation according to Graefe-
Anderson, Pyo and Zhu (2018) as shown in Table 4. Then we conduct the multiple regression 
analysis for employee wages and PPS of top five executives, which is shown in Table 5. In Table 
4, the first five columns show the relation of employee wages and PPS of CEO as well as the 
relation with leverage ratio, with the firm size, average sales per employee, market-to-book ratio, 
physical capital intensity and quits rate as the control variables. The last column shows the relation 
of employee wages and PVS of CEO. The significantly negative coefficients of PPS indicate the 
negative impacts of CEO PPS on employee wages, consistent with Graefe-Anderson, Pyo and Zhu 
(2018). From all the significantly positive coefficients of leverage ratio, we can conclude that 
higher leverage ratios lead to higher employee wages, concordant with Chemmanur et al. (2013) 
and Graefe-Anderson, Pyo and Zhu (2018). 
Table 5 reports the relation between employee wages and total PPS to the top five 
executives in the existence of control variables. The first four columns show that all coefficients 
of PPS are significantly negative at 1% level. Since Column 1 shows PPS with the coefficient of -
0.0184, we can compute the incremental wage changes relative to the changes in PPS. With Table 
1 showing PPS with a median of $472,720, we find that the level of the natural log of PPS increases 
by 1.5910 when we increase PPS by one standard deviation ($1,847,619). As a result, the natural 
log of average employee wages decreases by 0.0293 (=0.0184×1.5910). Starting from the median 
value of employee wage as shown in Table 1, the natural log of employee wage declines from 
10.8507 to 10.8214 (=10.8507-0.0293), which are translated from $51,571 to $50,081. Hence, the 
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average employee wage decreases by $1,490 when the compensation to the top five executives 
increases by one standard deviation.  
Regarding other control variables in Table 5, firm size, leverage, average sales per 
employee and physical capital intensity have significantly positive coefficients. The results 
indicate that firms with larger size pay more to employees, consistent with Brown and Medoff 
(1989). Employees are paid higher if they have higher sales because average sales per employee 
measures the employee productivity. Firms also pay their employees more if they increase leverage 
ratio to compensate additional risk-taking. These findings are consistent with Chemmanur et al. 
(2013).  
Moreover, in Column 2 and Column 4-6, we find that the market-to-book ratio has 
significantly negative coefficients, which implies that firms with higher market-to-book ratios pay 
more to their employees. It appears that investors are less likely to invest in the firms with high 
market-to-book ratios. Therefore, the employee wages of such firms are suppressed when there is 
not enough financial support. In addition, Column 3, Column 4, and Column 6 show that physical 
capital intensity has significantly positive coefficients, consistent with Graefe-Anderson, Pyo and 
Zhu (2018). It suggests that employees are paid more when firms have more growth opportunities. 
In Column 5, we add quits rate as a control variable and observe a significantly negative coefficient, 
suggesting that employees get paid more if firms are more specialized (Chemmanur et al., 2013). 
While Graefe-Andersn, Pyo and Zhu (2018) find that the quits rate is not significant with PPS of 
CEO as a main variable. The difference might reflect the difference of the main variable and 
sample period. Compared to Column 4, PCI turns to be significantly negative in the existence of 
quits rate. 
 In Column 6 of Table 5, we use PVS as the proxy for EBC to executives instead of PPS. 
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We note that PVS has a coefficient of -0.0029, which is not significant. Since there is not 
significant relation between PVS and employee wages, we use PPS as the proxy for incentive 
compensation from now on.  
5.3 Heckman Two-Step Analysis 
 Since many firms do not report staff expenses and the data on average employee wages 
of those firms are missing, we conduct a Heckman two-step analysis to address the concern on the 
potential sample selection bias. Panel A and Panel B of Table 6 present the first and second step 
results, respectively. In the first step, the coefficients of PPS in all the columns are significantly 
negative at 1% level. Firm size and leverage have significantly positive coefficients in each column. 
Average sales per employee has a negative coefficient and significant at 1% level in each column. 
In Column 2 and Column 4, market-to-book ratio has significantly negative coefficients. In 
Column 3 and Column 4, physical capital intensity has positive coefficients which are significant 
at 1% level. The results suggest that larger firms with higher leverage, lower average sales per 
employee, lower market-to-book ratio, and higher physical capital intensity have higher 
probability of reporting staff expenses. These results are consistent with Graefe-Anderson, Pyo 
and Zhu (2018).  
 In the second step, our data sample contains only the firms that report staff expenses. We 
add the inverse Mill’s ratio derived from the first step as an additional variable in the regressions 
of second step. In all the columns, the coefficients of PPS are significantly negative ranging from 
-0.0025 to -0.0087. The coefficients of firm size, leverage and average sales per employee remain 
significantly positive in each column. Market-to-book ratio still has negative coefficients and 
significant at 1% level in Column 2 and Column 4. In addition, the significant coefficients of the 
inverse Mill’s ratio suggest that the inverse Mill’s ratio makes contribution to making the 
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parameters unbiased. Therefore, we can conclude that the influence of PPS and leverage ratio on 
employee wages remains negative and positive, respectively, after controlling for sample selection 
bias. And this result is consistent with the results shown in Table 5.  
 From Table 5 and Table 6, we can have the conclusion that the executives with higher 
pay-performance sensitivity suppress employee wages. And higher leverage ratios can promote 
average employee wages. These conclusions are consistent with Graefe-Anderson, Pyo and Zhu 
(2018) as well as Chemmanur et al. (2013). Hence, our hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 are both 
supported.  
5.4 Employee Wages Analysis in Technology and Non-Technology Firms 
We further investigate the relation between employee wages and executive compensation 
in technology and non-technology firms. We run multiple regressions based on Eq. (8). Table 7 
reports the results of OLS regression in technology and non-technology separately. Comparing 
Panel A and Panel B, we find that the coefficients of PPS in technology firms are negatively 
significant, while they are not significant in non-technology firms. Table 8 shows results of 
multiple regressions with the data combined both technology firms and non-technology firms. For 
technology firms with an indicator variable of 1, the product term of “Tech” and “PPS” is reduced 
to a term “PPS” with its coefficient of 0.0488 in column (1), which is added to a single term “PPS” 
with its coefficient of -0.0451. The ending result of coefficient of “PPS” becomes close to zero as 
0.0037. PPS of technology firms appears to have no impacts on employee wages. On the other 
hand, for non-technology firms with an indicator variable 0, the product term with PPS becomes 
zero. The coefficient of PPS as -0.0451 stays intact. Hence, PPS of non-technology firms has 
significantly negative impacts on employee wages as shown in Graefe-Anderson et al. (2018). 
Moreover, the coefficients of firm size, leverage and average sales are all significantly positive in 
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both technology and non-technology firms. In technology firms, market-to-book ratios have 
significantly negative coefficients, while they are non-significant in non-technology firms. We 
also note that physical capital intensity has more significant effect on employee wages in 
technology firms then in non-technology firms.  
5.5 Employee Wages Analysis during Different Business Cycles 
 In order to test hypothesis 4, we divide our sample firms into financially safe firms and 
financially distressed firms according to Z-score. In Table 9, we find that PPS has a negative 
relation with employee wages in financially safe firms, but has no significant relation in financially 
distressed firms. Table 10 provides results of multiple regressions from the data combined both 
business states. For financially safe firms with an indicator variable of 1, the product term of “State” 
and “PPS” is reduced to a term “PPS” with its coefficient of 0.0618 in column (1), which is added 
to a single term “PPS” with its coefficient of -0.0402. The ending result of coefficient of “PPS” 
becomes positive as 0.0216. PPS of financially safe firms appears to have positive impacts on 
employee wages. On the other hand, for financially distressed firms with an indicator variable 0, 
the product term with PPS becomes zero. The coefficient of PPS as -0.0402 stays intact. Hence, 
PPS of financially distressed firms has significantly negative impacts on employee wages as shown 
in Graefe-Anderson et al. (2018). In addition, leverage has significant coefficients in financially 
distressed firms, but non-significant coefficients in financially safe firms. Market-to book ratio has 
more significant impacts on employee wages in financially safe firms compared to those in 
financially distressed firms.  
5.6 Robustness Tests 
 We conduct the robustness tests using a two-stage least square model and an alternate 
variable method. Table 11 presents the results of the two-stage model. From Panel A of Table 11 
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for the first stage, we find that the marginal tax rate has significantly positive coefficients, 
consistent with Chemmanur et al. (2013). The partial F-statistics of marginal tax rates are 28.30, 
28.59, 29.06 and 29.27, respectively. In the literature (Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002), the 
suggested critical F-value is 8.96 when the number of instruments is one. The instrument is 
considered to be strong if the first-stage partial F-statistic is above the critical value. The results 
suggest that the marginal tax rate is a strong instrumental variable. Panel B of Table 11 presents 
the results of the second stage. We employ the fitted value of leverage as an independent variable. 
The result shows that PPS coefficients maintain significantly negative, which is consistent with 
our previous findings in Table 5. The coefficients of leverage become negative after controlling 
for the potential endogeneity concern. Furthermore, the coefficients of firm size and average sales 
remain significantly positive as they are in Table 5. Hence, when we control for the potential 
endogeneity concern, executive incentive compensation maintains negative impacts on employee 
wages. 
 Table 12 reports the results of an alternate variable method for robustness of our findings. 
We use excess returns as an alternate measure for executives’ performance and add the interaction 
term of PPS and excess returns. From Table 12, we find that the coefficients of excess returns are 
all non-significant in all the columns. When we add PPS in Column 4, the coefficient of PPS 
becomes significantly negative. Moreover, the product term of PPS and excess returns carries a 
non-significant coefficient. It suggests that PPS cannot be replaced by excess returns as a proxy 
for the incentive compensation of executives in our study. 
5.7 Analysis of Changes in Employee Wages  
 In discussion above, we examine changes in employee wages relative to changes in PPS 
because we are interested in how much employee wages change given the changes in executive 
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PPS. Hence, it is important to analyze the relation between the two changes. We run multiple 
regressions based on Eq. (13). In Table 13, we find that the changes in PPS have a significantly 
positive relation with the changes in the average employee wages. More specifically, when there 
is a large increase in PPS, there is also a corresponding large increase in employee wages. Recall 
that when the change in PPS is positive, the corresponding change in employee wages is negative 
based on the analysis of levels. Further research is required for further investigation. 
There might be endogeneity concerns between PPS and employee wages because employee 
wages might affect PPS as well. However, when we consider decision makers of compensation, 
the endogeneity concerns are reduced. While corporate executives determine compensation to both 
executives and employees, it is hard to imagine that employees have any power in determining 
executive compensation. Hence, it is natural to expect that PPS derived from executive 
compensation might have impacts on employee wages.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 Executive compensation and income inequality within firms are one of interesting topics 
in corporate finance research. There are researchers examining how employee wage responds to 
several factors. This paper mainly contributes to the literature by investigating how employee wage 
is affected by the equity-based compensation to the top five executives in the existence of control 
variables. Our results suggest that the executive team still has the trend of suppressing employee 
wages, even though there is mutual monitoring among top managers.  
 We first conduct multiple regressions to examine the impacts of executive EBC on 
employee wages. We find that a negative relation between employee wages and executive 
compensation is statistically significant. When executives are granted more equity-based 
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compensation, employees receive lower wages, which might lead to a lower productivity and less 
profit. However, shareholders’ initial purpose of increasing equity-based compensation is to 
motivate executives for firm performance and reach the maximum value of firms. Therefore, it 
appears that the strategy of granting more EBC to executives might worsen the income inequality 
between executives and employees and deteriorate firm performance against maximum benefits 
for shareholders. 
 We move on to examine how the relation between executive EBC and employee wage 
changes in different industries and during different business cycles. We show that executive EBC 
has greater impacts on employee wages in non-technology firms than in technology firms, which 
is consistent with the previous literature. Since employees are more entrenched in non-technology 
firms than in technology firms (Berk, Stanton and Zechner, 2010), executives of the non-
technology firms seem to show less concerns on losing their employees. On the other hand, for 
firms in a weak financial state, the impacts from executive compensation on employee wages are 
stronger than for those in a good financial state. For the financially distressed firms, it might be 
hard for managers to gain financial support in other ways except for squeezing employee wages.  
 Finally, we study the relation between changes in employee wages and changes in 
executive PPS to investigate the extent of impacts that executive EBC has on employee wages. 
We find a significantly positive relation between the two changes.  
 Our results show that the impacts of incentive compensation to top five executives on 
employee wages are similar to those of CEO compensation. Hence, our findings support the 
perspective that top executives work together as one body in general and they are compensated as 
team perspective. On the other hand, since equity-based compensation to executives has negative 
impacts on employee wages, shareholders might not increase firm values through granting 
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executives more EBC. To promote morale and productivity of employees, it might be better to 
increase employee wages directly or grant equity to those employees who deliver excellent 
performance. There is much debate in the literature about how to promote firm value and relieve 
the income inequality as well as agency conflicts. Our study provides a new perspective for these 
concerns.  
  
35 
References 
Altman, E. I., 1968, Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate 
bankruptcy. Journal of Finance, 23(4), 589-609. 
Anderson, M. C., Banker, R. D., and Ravindran, S., 2000, Executive compensation in the 
information technology industry. Management Science, 46(4), 530-547. 
Baum, C. L., Ford, W. F., and Zhao, K. M., 2012, Top five executives’ share of core earnings. 
Journal of Financial and Economic Practice, 12 (2): 103-115. 
Bebchuk, L. A., and Fried, J. M., 2003, Executive compensation as an agency problem. National 
Bureau of Economic Research. No. w9813. 
Bebchuk, L. A., and Fried, J. M., 2004, Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of 
executive compensation. UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper. No. 537783. 
Bebchuk, L., and Grinstein, Y., 2005, The growth of executive pay. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 21(2), 283-303. 
Berk, J. B., Stanton, R., and Zechner, J., 2010, Human capital, bankruptcy, and capital structure. 
The Journal of Finance, 65(3), 891-926. 
Berle, A. A., and Means, G. C. (1962). The modern corporation and private property. New York: 
Macmillan, 1962. 
Bertrand, M., and Mullainathan, S., 2003, Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and 
managerial preferences. Journal of Political Economy, 111(5), 1043-1075. 
Bhagat, S., and Bolton, B. (2013). Director Ownership, Governance, and Performance. Journal of 
Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 48(1), 105–135. 
Black, F., and Scholes, M., 1973, The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. The Journal of 
Political Economy, 81(3), 637-654. 
36 
Brown, C., and Medoff, J., 1989, The Employer Size-Wage Effect. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 97, 1027-1059. 
Chemmanur, T. J., Cheng, Y., and Zhang, T., 2013, Human capital, capital structure, and employee 
pay: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 110(2), 478-502. 
Cheng Wang, H., Venezia, C. C., and Lou, Y. I., 2013, Determinants of chief executive officer 
compensation. The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, 7(4), 29-42. 
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., and Naveen, L., 2006, Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 79(2), 431-468. 
Conyon, M. J., and Peck, S. I., 1998, Board control, remuneration committees, and top 
management compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41(2), 146-157. 
Core, J., and Guay, W., 2002, Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their 
sensitivities to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(3), 613-630. 
Dyck, A., Morse, A., Zingales, L., 2010, Who blows the whistle on corporate fraud? The Journal 
of Finance, 65(6), 2213. 
Fama, E. F., 1980, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. The Journal of Political Economy, 
88(2), 288-307. 
Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C., 1983, Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26, 301-325. 
Givoly, D., Hayn, C., Ofer, A. R., and Sarig, O., 1992, Taxes and capital structure: Evidence from 
firms' response to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Review of Financial Studies, 5(2), 331-355. 
Graefe-Anderson, R., Pyo, U., and Zhu, B. (2018). Does CEO compensation suppress employee 
wages? Review of Accounting & Finance, 17(4), 426–452. 
Gabaix, X., and Landier, A, 2008, Why has CEO pay increased so much? The Quarterly Journal 
37 
of Economics, 123(1), 49-100. 
Harris, M., and Raviv, A., 1991, The theory of capital structure. Journal of Finance, 46(1), 297-
355. 
Heckman, J. J., 1979, Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica, 47(1), 153-
161. 
Hermalin, B. E., and Weisbach, M. S., 1991, The effects of board composition and direct incentives 
on firm performance. Financial Management, 20(4), 101-112. 
Jensen, M. C., and Meckling, W. H., 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Jensen, M. C., 1986, Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American 
Economic Review, 76(2). 
Jensen, M. C., and Murphy, K. J., 1990a, Performance pay and top-management incentives.  
 Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225-264. 
Jensen, M. C., and Murphy, K. J., 1990b, CEO incentives: It's not how much you pay, but how. 
Harvard Business Review, No. 3. 
John, K., and A. Knyazeva., 2006, Payout policy, agency conflicts, and corporate governance. 
Working Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=841064. 
Kaplan, S. N., 2012, Executive compensation and corporate governance in the US: perceptions, 
facts and challenges. National Bureau of Economic Research. No. w18395. 
Kong, X., 2017, Relationship between CEO Pay Slice and firm performance. Working Paper, 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957769. 
Laux, C., and Laux, V., 2009, Board committees, CEO compensation, and earnings management. 
The Accounting Review, 84(3), 869-891. 
38 
Leary, M., Roberts, M., 2010. The pecking order, debt capacity, and information asymmetry. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 95, 332–355. 
Li, C., 2018, Are Top Management Teams Compensated as Teams? A Structural Modeling 
Approach. Baruch College Zicklin School of Business Research Paper No. 2018-02-02.  
Li, Z., 2014, Mutual monitoring and corporate governance. Journal of Banking and Finance, 45, 
255–269. 
Loderer, C., and Martin, K., 1997, Executive stock ownership and performance tracking faint 
traces. Journal of Financial Economics, 45(2), 223-255. 
Mehran, H., 1995, Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 38(2), 163-184. 
Merton, R. C., 1973, Theory of rational option pricing. The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 4(1), 141-183. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W., 1988, Management ownership and market valuation: 
An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315. 
Murphy, K. J., 1985, Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1), 11-42. 
Murphy, K. J., 1986a, Top executives are worth every nickel they get. Harvard Business Review, 
64(2), 125-132. 
Murphy, K. J., 1999, Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485-2563. 
Murphy, K. J., 2012, Executive compensation: Where we are, and how we got there. Working 
Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2041679. 
Ofek, E., and Yermack, D., 2000, Taking stock: Equity‐based compensation and the evolution 
of managerial ownership. The Journal of Finance, 55(3), 1367-1384. 
39 
Pagano, M., and Volpin, P. F., 2005, Managers, workers, and corporate control. The Journal of 
Finance, 60(2), 841-868. 
Parsons, C., and Titman, S., 2009. Empirical capital structure: A review. Foundations and Trends 
in Finance, 3, 1-93. 
Parthasarathy, A., and Bhattacherjee, D., and Menon, K., 2006, Executive compensation, firm 
performance and corporate governance: an empirical analysis. Working Paper, Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=881730. 
Rajgopal, S., and Shevlin, T., 2002, Empirical evidence on the relation between stock option 
compensation and risk taking. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(2), 145-171. 
Stock, J., Wright, J., Yogo, M., 2002. A survey of weak instruments and weak identification in 
generalized method of moments. Journal of Business and Economics Statistics, 20, 518–
529. 
Tobin, J., 1958, Estimation of relationships for limited dependent variables. Econometrica, 26, 24-
36. 
Wooldridge, J., 2002, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Yang, Y. M., 2005, Corporate governance, agency conflicts, and equity returns along business 
cycles. Working Paper, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=870366. 
Yermack, D., 1996, Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-211. 
40 
Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of key variables 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Wage 2,860 56,338.86 38,629.96 7,161.73 31,166.35 51,571.04 71,950.20 213,024.11 
PPS (CEO) 2,860 701,435.58 2,069,810.17 0.00 86,603.53 205,985.85 572,313.62 38,418,652.54 
PPS 2,860 1,134,103.72 1,847,618.99 8,560.51 187,686.30 472,720.06 1,229,150.3
4 
11,727,599.67 
PVS (CEO) 2,860 94,018.15 226,946.49 0.00 10.14 12,773.67 89,318.36 3,213,652.08 
PVS 2,860 213,004.26 394,823.99 0.00 71.61 52,486.02 237,988.17 2,303,322.33 
Size 2,860 21.47 1.64 17.58 20.35 21.35 22.65 25.30 
Leverage 2,860 0.25 0.22 0.00 0.08 0.19 0.35 0.92 
Avgsale 2,860 239,532.13 247,657.54 23,533.22 93,300.94 170,443.74 287,547.15 1,477,569.62 
MTB 2,860 3.31 3.88 0.00 1.49 2.33 3.74 29.65 
PCI 2,860 0.77 0.42 0.05 0.41 0.78 1.08 1.84 
This table provides the descriptive statistics of the key variables. Wage is the average employee wages in the firm. PPS is the total Pay Performance 
Sensitivity of the top five executives; PVS is the total Pay Volatility Sensitivity of the top five executives of the firm; Size represents the firm size; Leverage 
is the firm market leverage ratio; Avgsale is the average sales per employee; MTB is market-to-book ratio of the firm; PCI is the physical capital intensity 
of the firm; All of the variables in our data sample ranges from fiscal year 1992 to 2017. The units of the data on Wage, PPS, PVS and Avgsale are one 
dollar. 
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Table 2: Sample correlations of key variables of multivariable analysis of Employee Wages 
 
Wage PPS PVS Firm size Leverage Average sales MTB PCI 
Wage 1 
       
PPS 0.040 1 
      
PVS -0.096 0.413 1 
     
Firm size 0.221 0.570 0.308 1 
    
Leverage 0.128 -0.285 -0.139 -0.171 1 
   
Average sales 0.726 0.078 -0.049 0.312 0.075 1 
  
MTB -0.051 0.217 0.099 0.306 -0.244 -0.014 1 
 
PCI -0.212 -0.060 0.025 -0.027 0.112 -0.129 -0.050 1 
This table shows Pearson correlations between the key variables of multivariate analysis of Employee wages. Wage is the natural log of average employee 
wages; PPS is the natural log of the total Pay Performance Sensitivity of the top five executives; PVS is the natural log of the total Pay Volatility Sensitivity 
of the top five executives of the firm; Size is the firm size; Leverage is the firm market leverage ratio; Average sales is the natural log of the average sales 
per employee; MTB is market-to-book ratio of the firm; PCI is the physical capital intensity of the firm; This data sample contains 35,512 firm-year 
observations from fiscal year 1992 to 2017; Boldface indicates significance at 1% level and boldface with * indicates significance at 10% level. 
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Table 3: Expenses to workers during different sub-periods 
Compensation Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
  (1992-2000) (2001-2007) (2008-2017) 
Staff Expenses 1,925,181,351  2,208,144,646  2,029,027,891  
Operating Expenses 3,313,323,933  4,583,042,627  6,066,920,769  
Ratio of Staff Expenses to Operating 
Expenses 
0.58  0.48  0.33  
TDC1--CEO 3,968,010  5,244,069  5,943,852  
TDC2--CEO 3,576,109  5,501,672  7,468,717  
PPS--CEO 1,408,134  1,271,301  759,834  
TDC1--Top 5 Executives 1,856,860  2,410,678  3,754,691  
TDC2--Top 5 Executives 1,511,852  2,424,094  4,311,489  
PPS--Top 5 Executives 2,262,338  2,220,253  1,281,237  
Average Employee Wage 58,347  54,731  71,161  
This table shows the average annual compensation to CEO, top five executives and employees as well as the 
average annual staff expenses and operating expenses during the three time periods: from 1992 to 2000; from 
2001 to 2007; from 2008 to 2017. TDC1 is the total compensation which is comprised of: salary, bonus, other 
annual, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-
term incentive payouts, and all other total. TDC2 is also the total compensation which is measured in another 
way. TDC2 is composed of the following: salary, bonus, other annual, total value of restricted stock granted, net 
value of stock options exercised, long-term incentive payouts, and all other total. PPS is the Pay Performance 
Sensitivity. All the data items are collected individually. The units of the data on Staff Expenses, Operating 
Expenses, TDC1, TDC2, PPS and Average Employee Wage are one dollar.                                                
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Table 4: Ordinary least square (OLS) regressions of Employee Wages (CEO) 
Wage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PPS -0.0170*** -0.0174*** -0.0171*** -0.0175*** -0.0137* 
 
 (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0072)  
PVS      0.0002 
      (0.0023) 
Firm size 0.0240*** 0.0281*** 0.0232*** 0.0271*** 0.0198*** 0.0197*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0074) (0.0058) 
Leverage 0.2860*** 0.2695*** 0.2653*** 0.2497*** 0.2817*** 0.2696*** 
 (0.0365) (0.0369) (0.0364) (0.0368) (0.0452) (0.0382) 
Average sales 0.4462*** 0.4451*** 0.4572*** 0.4561*** 0.4854*** 0.4773*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0162) (0.0139) 
MTB  -0.0058***  -0.0055*** -0.0054** -
0.0059***   
(0.0020)  (0.0020) （0.0026） (0.0021) 
PCI   0.1527*** 0.1513*** 0.1757*** 0.1579*** 
   (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0314) (0.0253) 
Quits     -0.2362***  
     (0.0313)  
Intercept 4.4343*** 4.3932*** 4.1625*** 4.1257*** 3.1701*** 3.7655*** 
 (0.1664) (0.1668) (0.1705) (0.1709) (0.2631) (0.1848) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Dummy 
Dummy 
Dummy 
dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,860 2,860 2,860 2,860 1,724 2,392 
Adj. R2 0.7743 0.7749 0.7777 0.7782 0.7835 0.7771 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors of the regressions in the OLS regression model of employee 
wage and CEO PPS. The dependent variable is the average employee wages. We take the natural log of the wages 
and label them as “Wage” in the table. PPS is the natural log of the total Pay Performance Sensitivity of CEO; PVS 
is the natural log of the total Pay Volatility Sensitivity of CEO of the firm. Quits rate is collected from 2001 to 2017. 
The other variables in the data sample range from fiscal year 1992 to 2017. Numbers in the parentheses are the standard 
errors. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Ordinary least square (OLS) regressions of Employee Wages 
Wage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PPS -0.0184*** -0.0183*** -0.0185*** -0.0184*** -0.0192*  
 
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0113) 
 
PVS      -0.0029 
      (0.0020) 
Firm size 0.0261*** 0.0293*** 0.0253*** 0.0283*** 0.0127* 0.0269*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0104) (0.0054) 
Leverage 0.2982*** 0.2852*** 0.2755*** 0.2634*** 0.1572*** 0.2891*** 
 (0.0348) (0.0352) (0.0347) (0.0351) (0.0586) (0.0357) 
Average sales 0.4491*** 0.4484*** 0.4597*** 0.4590*** 0.4230*** 0.4736*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0177) (0.0131) 
MTB  -0.0049***  -0.0046** -0.0067* -0.0058*** 
  (0.0020)  (0.0020) （0.0035） (0.0020) 
PCI   0.1551*** 0.1540*** -0.1815*** 0.1606*** 
   (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0317) (0.0239) 
Quits     -0.2345***  
     (0.0164)  
Intercept 4.3604*** 4.3211*** 4.0913*** 4.0564*** 6.3987*** 3.6484*** 
 (0.1596) (0.1603) (0.1633) (0.1638) (0.2893) (0.1746) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Dummy 
ddddDdummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,860 2,860 2,860 2,860 1,818 2,640 
Adj. R2 0.7769 0.7774 0.7804 0.7808 0.5676 0.7780 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors of the regressions in the OLS regression model of Employee 
Wage. The dependent variable is the average employee wages. We take the natural log of the wages and label them as 
“Wage” in the table. PPS is the natural log of the total Pay Performance Sensitivity of the top five executives; PVS is 
the natural log of the total Pay Volatility Sensitivity of the top five executives of the firm. Quits rate is collected from 
2001 to 2017. The other variables in the data sample range from fiscal year 1992 to 2017. Numbers in the parentheses 
are the standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Heckman two step analysis of Employee Wages 
Panel A: First step--Probit model of firms reporting data on employee wages. 
Pro  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PPS -0.0423*** -0.0416*** -0.0284*** -0.0272*** 
  (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0101) 
Firm size 0.1496*** 0.1549*** 0.1455*** 0.1361*** 
  (0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0101) 
Leverage 0.3048*** 0.2791*** 0.2456*** 0.1942*** 
  (0.0634) (0.0644) （0.0642） (0.0669) 
Average sales -0.2354*** -0.2354*** -0.2199*** -0.2210*** 
  (0.0174) (0.0175） (0.0178) (0.0180) 
MTB   -0.0104***   -0.0092** 
    (0.0036)   (0.0036) 
PCI     0.5743*** 0.5619*** 
      (0.0380) (0.0384) 
Exchange Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 30,856 30,856 30,856 30,856 
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Panel B: Second step--Regression of employee wages in firms with data on staff expenses. 
Wage  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PPS -0.0025** -0.0033** -0.0077* -0.0087** 
  (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0085) (0.0085) 
Firm size 0.0225* 0.0305** -0.0322*** -0.0264** 
  (0.0137) (0.0142) (0.0106) (0.0111) 
Leverage 0.3466*** 0.3189*** 0.2164*** 0.2031*** 
  (0.0538) (0.0529) (0.0494) (0.0493) 
Average sales 0.3602*** 0.3597*** 0.4483*** 0.4468*** 
  (0.0240) (0.0239) (0.0200) (0.0200) 
MTB   -0.0106***   -0.0059*** 
    (0.0029)   (0.0028) 
PCI     -0.0184 -0.0153 
      (0.0461) (0.0462) 
Inverse Mill's ratio 1.2456** 1.2846** -1.5333*** -1.4719*** 
  (0.6100) (0.6031) (0.4087) (0.4100) 
Intercept 4.4954*** 4.3616*** 6.0584*** 5.9494*** 
  (0.3286) (0.3991) (0.3375) (0.3441) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,860 2,860 2,860 2,860 
Adj. R2 0.6767 0.6778 0.6794 0.6803 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors obtained from Heckman two-step analysis model of 
average Employee wages. In the first step, we employ a probit model of whether the firm reports the data on 
employee wages. The dependent variable in the first step is denoted as “pro”. It is one if the employee wage data 
is not missing and zero otherwise. In the second step, we run an OLS regression model of employee wages. The 
dependent variable in the second step is the natural log of the average employee wages. The inverse Mill’s ratio 
derived from the first step is added in the second step model. PPS is the natural log of the total Pay Performance 
Sensitivity of the top five executives. All the variables in the first and second steps range from fiscal year 1992 
and 2017. Numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 7: PPS and Employee Wages: OLS regressions in technology and non-technology firms 
Variables A: Technology firms B: Non-technology firms 
Wage (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PPS -0.0144** -0.0139** -0.0174*** -0.0170*** -0.0136 -0.0138 -0.0167 -0.0170 
  (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0171) (0.0172) （0.0172） (0.0173) 
Firm size 0.0222*** 0.0256*** 0.0177*** 0.0203*** 0.0363** 0.0368** 0.0339** 0.0345** 
  (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0144) (0.0148) 
Leverage 0.2278*** 0.2162*** 0.1533*** 0.1451*** 0.6548*** 0.6514*** 0.6382*** 0.6345*** 
  (0.0346) (0.0349) (0.0338) (0.0341) (0.0920) (0.0942) (0.0927) (0.0950) 
Average sales 0.4808*** 0.4785*** 0.5111*** 0.5091*** 0.3459*** 0.3467*** 0.3509*** 0.3517*** 
  (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0315) (0.0318) (0.0317) (0.0320) 
MTB   -0.0052***  -0.0039***   -0.0001   -0.0001 
    (0.0020)   (0.0019)   (0.0048)   (0.0047) 
PCI     0.3120*** 0.2994***     -0.0738 -0.0739 
      (0.0238) (0.0239)     （0.0536） (0.0536) 
Intercept 4.0868*** 4.0592*** 3.5607*** 3.5443*** 5.7320*** 5.7181*** 5.8539*** 5.8392*** 
  (0.1688) (0.1689) (0.1676) (0.1677) (0.4880) (0.4949) (0.4957) (0.5023) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,021 2,021 2,021 2,021 839 839 839 839 
Adj. R2 0.8514 0.8518 0.8624 0.8627 0.4210 0.4203 0.4216 0.4209 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors of the regressors in the OLS regression model of average employee wage in technology and non-
technology firm, respectively. The dependent variable is the natural log of the average employee wages. PPS is the natural log of the total Pay Performance 
Sensitivity of the top five executives. All the variables in data sample range from fiscal year 1992 to 2017. Numbers in the parentheses are the standard 
errors. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10% 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Difference of coefficients of PPS for Employee Wages in technology and non-technology firms 
Wage (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PPS -0.0451*** -0.0445*** -0.0568*** -0.0562*** 
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0142) (0.0142) 
Technology -0.4081** -0.3991** -0.5739*** -0.5653*** 
(0.1963) (0.1961) (0.1935) (0.1933) 
Product of Tech and 
PPS 
0.0488*** 0.0481*** 0.0611*** 0.0603*** 
(0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0148) (0.0148) 
Firm size 0.0233*** 0.0281*** 0.0266*** 0.0320*** 
(0.0080) (0.0082) (0.0078) (0.0081) 
Leverage 0.2509*** 0.2291*** 0.3094*** 0.2857*** 
(0.0458) (0.0465) (0.0453) (0.0461) 
Average sales 0.6396*** 0.6364*** 0.6231*** 0.6194*** 
(0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0123) (0.0124) 
MTB   -0.0068**   -0.0076*** 
  (0.0027)   (0.0027) 
PCI     -0.2398*** -0.2417*** 
    (0.0236) (0.0236) 
Intercept 2.9150*** 2.8715*** 3.3788*** 3.3340*** 
(0.2343) (0.2347) (0.2347) (0.2349) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy No No No No 
Obs. 2,860 2,860 2,860 2,860 
Adj.R2 0.5481 0.5489 0.5638 0.5649 
 This table reports the difference of the coefficients of PPS on employee wages in different industries. 
Technology is a dummy variable, which is one if the firm is a technology firm, and zero otherwise. We add the 
product of dummy variable “Technology” and PPS as one of the variables. The dependent variable is the natural 
log of the average employee wages. PPS is the natural log of the total Pay Performance Sensitivity of the top 
five executives. All the variables in the data sample range from fiscal year 1992 to 2017. Numbers in the 
parentheses are the standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 9: PPS and Employee Wages over business cycles 
Variables A: Financially Safe Firms B: Financially Distressed Firms 
Wage (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
PPS -0.0266*** -0.0313*** -0.0308*** -0.0119 -0.0147 -0.0152 
(0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0145) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
Firm size 0.0451*** 0.0409*** 0.0436*** 0.0092 0.0120 0.0153 
(0.0080) (0.0077) (0.0079) (0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0140) 
Leverage 0.1287 0.0345 0.0259 0.2940*** 0.2888*** 0.2763*** 
(0.0911) (0.0923) (0.0925) (0.0591) (0.0579) (0.0589) 
Average sales 0.4630*** 0.4811*** 0.4810*** 0.3455*** 0.3490*** 0.3486*** 
(0.0157) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0253) 
MTB -0.0038*  -0.0034*** -0.0070  -0.0056 
(0.0023)  (0.0023) (0.0047）  (0.0047） 
PCI  0.1725*** 0.1709***  0.1592*** 0.1545*** 
 (0.0326) (0.0326)  (0.0448) (0.0449) 
Intercept 3.9087*** 3.6606*** 3.6188*** 5.8295*** 5.5812*** 5.5442*** 
(0.2179) (0.2214) (0.2231) (0.3432) (0.3492) (0.3505) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obj. 1,662 1,662 1,662 728 728 728 
Adj. R2 0.8023 0.8054 0.8055 0.7487 0.7525 0.7526 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors of the regressors in the OLS regression model of average employee wage within different business cycles. 
The dependent variable is the natural log of the average employee wages. PPS is the natural log of the total Pay Performance Sensitivity of the top five executives. 
All the variables in data sample range from fiscal year 1992 to 2017. Numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10% 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
50 
Table 10: Difference of coefficients of PPS for Employee Wages over business cycles 
Wage (1) (2) (3) 
PPS -0.0402*** -0.0470*** -0.0486*** 
(0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0145) 
State -0.9759*** -1.0821*** -1.1101*** 
(0.2128) (0.2098) (0.2097) 
Product of State and PPS 0.0618*** 0.0717*** 0.0740*** 
(0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
Firm size 0.0197** 0.0151* 0.0216** 
(0.0091) (0.0087) (0.0090) 
Leverage 0.0127 0.1073* 0.0866 
(0.0583) (0.0574) (0.0579) 
Average sales 0.5814*** 0.5645*** 0.5605*** 
(0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0129) 
MTB -0.0071**  -0.0080*** 
(0.0030)  (0.0029) 
PCI  -0.2449*** -0.2475*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0272) 
Intercept 4.0094*** 4.5404*** 4.5024*** 
(0.2396) (0.2416) (0.2417) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy No No No 
Obs. 2,390 2,390 2,390 
Adj. R2 0.5328 0.5472 0.5485 
This table reports the difference of the coefficients of PPS on employee wages over business cycles. State is a 
dummy variable, which is one if the firm is in a good state, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is the 
natural log of the average employee wages; PPS is the natural log of the total Pay Performance Sensitivity of 
the top five executives; Product of State and PPS is the product of dummy variable and PPS; All the variables 
in the data sample range from fiscal year 1992 to 2017. Numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors. *, 
** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 11: Instrumental variable regressions of Employee Wages: Two-stage least square regression 
analysis 
Panel A: First stage--Leverage is the dependent variable. 
Leverage (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PPS -0.0381*** -0.0382*** -0.0368*** -0.0369*** 
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) 
MTR 0.5373*** 0.4414*** 0.5250*** 0.4324*** 
(0.0999) (0.1010) (0.0992) (0.1003) 
Firm size 0.0043 0.0085*** 0.0034 0.0075** 
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0032) 
Average sales 0.0153*** 0.0131*** 0.0193*** 0.0170*** 
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
MTB 
 
-0.0058***  -0.0056*** 
 (0.0011)  (0.0011) 
PCI  0.0585*** 0.0572*** 
  (0.0093) (0.0093) 
EBIT/AT -1.1375*** -1.0507*** -1.1215*** -1.0378*** 
(0.0573) (0.0578) (0.0554) (0.0575) 
Std. (EBIT/AT) -0.0321 -0.0282 -0.0284 -0.0246 
(0.0253) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0250) 
Intercept 0.4221*** 0.4030*** 0.3355*** 0.3189*** 
(0.0692) (0.0690) (0.0700) (0.0698) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy No No No No 
Obs. 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 
Adj. R2 0.2334 0.2413 0.2443 0.2516 
Partial F-test of MTR F-statistic    28.30         28.59          29.06          29.27 
  P value of partial F-test        <.0001        <.0001         <.0001         <.0001                  
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Panel B: Second stage--Average Employee Wage is the dependent variable. 
Wage (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PPS -0.0353* -0.0542* -0.0367* -0.0557** 
（0.0215） (0.0279) (0.0208) (0.0271) 
Leverage -1.1691** -1.6581** -1.0867** -1.5925** 
（0.5109） (0.6848) (0.5098) (0.6849) 
Firm size 0.0346*** 0.0482***  0.0378*** 0.0511*** 
(0.0093) (0.0123) (0.0089) (0.0117) 
Average sales 0.5965*** 0.5979*** 0.5809*** 0.5842*** 
(0.0146) (0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0175) 
MTB 
 
-0.0158***  -0.0160*** 
 (0.0055)  (0.0054) 
PCI  -0.2113*** -0.1855*** 
  (0.0394) (0.0481) 
EBIT/AT -3.0765*** -3.3948*** -3.0406*** -3.3678*** 
(0.5382) (0.6639) (0.5296) (0.6561) 
Std. (EBIT/AT) -0.0578 -0.0627 -0.0687 -0.0723 
(0.0721) (0.0785) (0.0699) (0.0764) 
Intercept 3.9871*** 4.1410*** 4.2650*** 4.3872*** 
(0.3227) (0.3834) (0.2852) (0.3345) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy No No No No 
Obs. 2,519 2,519 2,519 2,519 
Adj. R2 0.5383 0.4981 0.5597 0.5173 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors obtained from 2LSL robustness test. In the first stage, we 
use marginal tax rate based on income before interest expense has been deducted (MTRB) as the instrumental 
variable. And the dependent variable is leverage which is measured as market leverage. In the second stage, we 
include the fitted value of leverage derived from the first stage as an independent variable. The dependent variable 
is the natural log of average employee wages. PPS is the natural log of the total Pay Performance Sensitivity of 
the top five executives. The data for the variables in the first and second stages range from fiscal year 1992 and 
2017. Numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 12: Interaction effect of PPS and excess return in the OLS regressions of Employee Wages 
Wage (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PPS    -0.0137* 
    (0.0083) 
Firm size 0.0192*** 0.0230*** 0.0187*** 0.0310*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0048) (0.0059) 
Leverage 0.3192*** 0.3059*** 0.2958*** 0.2623*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0350) (0.0345) (0.0356) 
Average sales 0.4549*** 0.4542*** 0.4670*** 0.4677*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
MTB  -0.0056***  -0.0053*** 
  (0.0020)  (0.0019) 
PCI   0.1687*** 0.1691*** 
   (0.0231) (0.0231) 
Excess return 0.0419 0.1057 0.0233 -0.1272 
 (0.2167) (0.2176) (0.2147) (0.3815) 
PPS× Excess return    0.0229 
    (0.0278) 
Intercept 4.2125*** 4.1700*** 3.9050*** 3.8383*** 
 (0.1603) (0.1608) (0.1642) (0.1783) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,829 2,829 2,829 2,829 
Adj. R2 0.7809 0.7815 0.7850 0.7860 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors of the regressors in the OLS regression model of average 
employee wages with examining the robustness of PPS using excess return as alternate variable. The dependent 
variable is the natural log the average employee wages; PPS is the natural log of the total Pay Performance 
Sensitivity of the top five executives. We add a cross product term of PPS and excess return, which can capture 
the interaction effect of the two variables. All the variables in the data sample range from the fiscal year 1992 to 
2017. Numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 13: OLS Regression of differences of Employee Wages and differences in PPS 
Diff_wage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Diff_PPS 0.0099** 0.0098** 0.0099** 0.0098** 0.0168*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0060) 
Firm size -0.0044* -0.0048* -0.0044* -0.0048* -0.0030 
 (0.0026) (0.0027) （0.0026） (0.0027) (0.0035) 
Leverage 0.0078 0.0094 0.0074 0.0089 -0.0045 
 (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0183) (0.0221) 
Average sales 0.0394*** 0.0395*** 0.0396*** 0.0398*** 0.0415*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0083) 
MTB  0.0006  0.0006 0.0007 
  
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0011) (0.0013) 
PCI   0.0034 0.0036 0.0216 
   (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0159) 
Quits     0.0121 
     (0.0158) 
Intercept -0.3208*** -0.3157*** -0.3268*** -0.3220*** -0.4496*** 
 (0.0859) (0.0863) (0.0888) (0.0891) (0.1340) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,559 2,559 2,559 2,559 1,720 
Adj. R2 0.0157 0.0160 0.0154 0.0151 0.0265 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors of the regressors in the OLS regression model of the 
changes of PPS and the changes of employee wages. The dependent variable is the difference between the natural 
log of average employee wages in this year and that in the last year. Diff_PPS is the difference between the 
natural log of PPS in this year and that in the last year. The other variables remain the same as in Table 5. The 
data sample for all the variables ranges from fiscal year 1993 to 2017. Numbers in the parentheses are the 
standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
